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only by reason of mutual or successive relation to the same
right of property.7
The doctrine of res adjudicata (or res judicata) em-
braces two main rules, the distinction between which is
frequently ignored by the courts." One rule is that a
former adjudication, rendered on the merits, is an absolute
bar to a subsequent suit between the same parties or their
privies upon the same claim or demand,9 and the other rule
is that an adjudication of any issue, fact, or matter is con-
clusive as between the parties and their privies for the pur-
pose of a subsequent action or suit, although this be upon a
different claim or demand.10 The language of the opinion
in Horowitz v. Horowitz seems to suggest an anomalous
extension of the latter rule, to the effect that the defendant
to a bill in equity, though securing an unqualified decree
dismissing the bill, is precluded from asserting, in a subse-
quent suit by the same plaintiff, any defense which he
may have asserted in the first suit.
IMPEACHMENT BY A PARTY OF HIS OWN WITNESS
Chenoweth v. Baltimore Contracting Company'
The Defendant-appellee contracting company operated
a railroad yard in which coal cars were emptied, shifted
and transferred. Decedent, an employee of the Defendant
company, was found dead in this yard. The surviving widow
and child brought this action on the ground that his death
was caused by the negligence of Defendant. Plaintiffs
called as their witnesses certain employees of the Defendant
company and attempted to interrogate these witnesses as
to other prior statements allegedly inconsistent with their
statements at the trial. The lower court refused to permit
the attempted interrogation and impeachment and Plain-
tiffs appealed from the ruling, after a verdict and judg-
ment for the Defendants.
715 R. C. L., Judgments, Sec. 488; 1 FREEMAN, op. cit. supra n. 2, Sec. 438.8 As to the distinction between the two rules, see 2 BLAcK, op. cit. supra
n. 5, Sees. 506, 673; 2 FIBMMAN, op. cit. supra n. 2, Sees. 676, 677; 34 C. J.
743, 874, Judgments, Sees. 1154, 1283; Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S.
351, 24 L. Ed. 195 (1877).
As In State v. Brown, 64 Md. 199, 1 A. 54 (1885) ; Impervious Products
Co. v. Gray, 127 Md. 64, 96 A. 1 (1915) : Moodhe v. Schenker, 176 Md. 259,
4 A. (2d) 453 (1939).1 As in Trayhern v. Colburn, 66 Md. 277, 7 A. 459 (1886); Barrick v.
Horner, 78 Md. 243, 27 A. 1111 (1893) ; Miller v. Miller, 159 Md. 204, 150
A. 451 (1930).
1 6 A. (2d) 625 (Md. 1939).
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Held: Affirmed-A party will not be allowed either to
impeach his own witness by proof of the latter's contradic-
tory statements on other occasions, or to examine him as to
such statements, unless the party was enticed or entrapped
into calling the witness by the latter's statements made to
him or his attorney, and the statements are inconsistent
with his testimony at the trial.
As a general rule a party may not impeach his own wit-
ness. The basis for this restriction appears to be historical
rather than logical. In Medieval England witnesses were
not called to testify to the controverted facts but were more
in the nature of character witnesses. Each litigant brought
"oath helpers" who swore that, from their general knowl-
edge of the litigant's character, his contention or claim
must be valid and just. The witness was considered as a
partisan testifying in behalf of the party who called him.
A trace of this attitude exists today. Thus the party call-
ing a witness is regarded as vouching for his credibility,
since, by presenting him, he impliedly alleges that he is
worthy of credence and may not thereafter impeach him.2
Several theories have been advanced in an attempt to
explain why the rule of impeaching one's own witness per-
sists in any form today. Dean Wigmore states that:
"If it were permissible and therefore common, to
impeach the character of one's witness whose testi-
mony had been disappointing, no witness would care
to risk the abuse of his character which might be
launched at him by the disappointed party. This fear
of the possible consequences would operate subjec-
tively to prevent a repentant witness from recanting
a previously falsified story, and would more or less
affect every witness who knew that the party calling
him expected him to tell a particular story.... Spec-
ulative as this danger may be, it furnishes the only
shred of reason on which the rule may be supported. ' 3
It has also been suggested that by offering a witness in
proof of his case the party thereby represents him as
worthy of belief and is estopped from attacking his char-
acter or reputation for truth and veracity thereafter. To
Holtzoff, The New York Rule As to Impeachment By a Party of His
Own Witnesses (1924) 24 Col. L. Rev. 714; 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2nd Ed.
1923) Sec. 896; 1 GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE (Lewis's Ed. 1896) Sec. 442.
'2 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra n. 2, See. 899.
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do so would be evidence of disrespect toward the Court.'
Furthermore, permitting a party to impeach his own wit-
ness may tend to confuse the jury by presenting it with the
separate question of credibility of the witness and by dis-
turbing the normal form and procedure of the trial.5 The
situation devolves into a balancing of possible probative
force against possible jury confusion. Whatever may be
the reason for the rule it still exists to a modified degree
in most jurisdictions.
In applying the rule a distinction is made as to the type
of impeachment attempted. Impeachment of a litigant's
own witness could possibly be accomplished in three gen-
eral ways, not all of which are recognized by the courts as
proper methods. These methods are: (1) by attacking
the witness's general credibility (including bad reputation
and bias or interest); (2) by showing through extrinsic
evidence and testimony that the facts are otherwise than
as testified to by the witness (contradiction as distin-
guished from impeachment); and, (3) by introducing prior
statements of the witness inconsistent with those made on
the witness stand.
As to the first method, it is an apparently universal rule
that a party may not discredit his own witness by proof
of his general bad reputation for truth and veracity.6 Nor
may there be shown bias or interest. Poe is of the opinion
that "When a party calls a witness he necessarily vouches
for his credibility and good character; and accordingly the
general doctrine is well established that he is not at liberty
to assail or impeach the credit and character which he has
represented as worthy of belief."' 7 The Court of Appeals
has consistently supported this view,8 in one instance citing
the exact language quoted above.9
I Ladd, Impeachment of One's Own Witness-New Developments (1936)
4 U. of Ch. L. Rev. 69; GREENLEAF, 10c. Cit. supra n. 2.5 Murphy v. State, 120 Md. 229, 87 A. 811, Ann. Cas. 1914 B 1117 (1913).
670 C. J. 1033; GREENLEAF, loe. cit. supra n. 2.
2 PoE, PLEADING AND PRACTICE (5th Ed. 1925) 233.
s "By offering the witness, the Plaintiff represented him as worthy of
belief and he cannot afterwards offer any evidence for the purpose of dis-
crediting him." B. & 0. Ry. v. State, 107 Md. 642, 659, 69 A. 439 (1908).
" . . It was not competent for the Plaintiff at any stage of the trial or
of his examination to impeach the credibility of this witness." B. & 0.
Ry. v. State, 41 Md. 268, 295 (1875).
"In no case can a party calling a witness be permitted to impeach his
general reputation for truth and veracity." State v. B. & 0. Ry., 117 Md.
280, 283, 83 A. 166 (1912); Smith v. Briscoe, 65 Md. 561, 568, 5 A. 334
(1886). See also W. B. & A. v. Faulkner, 187 Md. 451, 461, 112 A. 820
(1921) ; Franklin Bank v. Steam Navigation Co., 11 G. & J. 28, 33 Am.
Dec. 687 (Md. 1889).
'Patapsco Loan Co. v. Hobbs, 134 Md. 222, 229, 106 A. 619 (1919).
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However, where the witness is one required to be called
by law, as for example, the attesting witnesses to a will, the
restriction is not applicable, and the party may impeach
the witness in such a case as to his character for truth."0
Another exception to the rule, recently enacted by stat-
ute,1' has been made where the witness called is "an ad-
verse party or any officer, director or managing agent of a
public or private corporation or of a partnership or associa-
tion which is an adverse party". In such a case the litigant
may "interrogate him by leading questions and contradict
and impeach him in all respects as if he had been called by
the adverse party".
If the above authorities and cases mean that the litigant
by calling an ordinary witness guarantees his general cred-
ibility, and apparently such an interpretation would be
reasonable, then the litigant should be "prohibited from ex-
posing, by any means whatever an error of that witness
and especially an error which carries with it an implica-
tion of other errors from whatever source".12 But it seems
that this reasoning, logical as it may be, has not been fol-
lowed by the courts in regard to all types of impeachment,
for example incidental impeachment through contra-
dictory testimony of another witness or, in certain cases,
through proof of prior inconsistent statements.
In regard to the second method of impeachment it is
again a generally universal rule that a party may show
through extrinsic evidence and testimony of another wit-
ness that the facts are otherwise than as testified to by his
own witness.13 "He may contradict him by another wit-
ness as to any fact material to the issue, to which he has
deposed, in order to show how the fact really was.'
4
Clearly the collateral effect of such proof is to show that
the witness is unworthy of belief, but this incidental im-
peachment has been permitted in Maryland at least since
Wolfe v. Hauver in 1843.11 Even contradiction by other
witnesses, however, is not unqualified for the only evidence
which is allowed to be contradicted must be material, and
on relevant points, and the purpose of such contradiction
10 GmNEAN , op. cit. supra n. 2, Sec. 443.
U Md. Laws 1939, Ch. 380, (To be Md. Code Supp., Art. 35, Sec. 5).
29 WGMOE Op. cit. supra n. 2, See. 902.
"170 C. J. 1341; 2 PoA op. cit. supra n. 7, 273; GMWNLEA , loc. cit. aupra
n. 10.
B. & 0. Ry. v. State, 107 Md. 642, 659, 69 A. 439 (1908).
"1 Gill 84 (Md. 1843).
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must be to get at the truth and may not merely be for the
purpose of discrediting the witness.16
As to the third question, whether a party may impeach
his own witness by introducing prior statements of the
witness, inconsistent with those made by him at the trial,
the courts are in conflict. Neither view is without its dis-
advantages. To allow a party to cross-examine his own
witness on allegedly self-contradictory statements, and
then by other witnesses to prove their having been made
would enable the party to get before the jury declarations
of the witness which were made out of court, were not
under oath, and, in fact, were not subject to any of the
various devices used to increase the reliability of testi-
mony.
On the other hand to refuse to permit a party to intro-
duce evidence of his own witness's prior inconsistent state-
ments would be inequitable in situations where the testi-
mony is entirely different from what the party had reason
to believe the witness would give. Occasional permission
to prove such statements is necessary for the litigant's
"protection against the contrivance of an artful witness;
and the danger of its being regarded by the jury as sub-
stantive evidence is no greater in such cases, than it is
where the contradictory declarations are proved by the
adverse party."17
It is well settled in Maryland that generally a party
may not impeach his own witness by showing his prior in-
consistent statements. However, in certain situations, the
rule has been relaxed. As seen above for general credibil-
ity, it does not apply to witnesses required by law to be
called nor to the adverse party when called as a witness.
For that matter, prior inconsistent statements of the ad-
verse party were permitted to be shown as party-oppo-
nents' admissions, even before the recent amendatory stat-
ute.18 The statute, therefore, has not changed the law in
regard to impeachment by self contradiction of the adverse
party but has merely extended this privilege to include
officers, directors or managing agents of a corporation, part-
nership or association which is itself an adverse party.
20 Murphy v. State, 120 Md. 229, 87 A. 811, Ann. Cas. 1914 B 1117, 1124
(1913); Wolfe v. Hauver, 1 Gill 84 (Md. 1843); Franklin Bank v. Steam
Navigation Co., 11 G. & J. 38, 33 Am. Dec. 687 (Md. 1839); Sewell v.
Gardner, 48 Md. 178 (1878).
d ( NrENA , op. cit. 8upra n. 2, Sec. 444.
ISupra n. 11.
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In regard to impeaching one's own ordinary witnesses
through prior inconsistent statements the Maryland Court
has relaxed the prohibition in certain cases. Its reason for
so doing is capable of two rationalizations. First, it has
been suggested that proof of prior inconsistent statements
is permitted on the ground of putting the party right with
the court and jury by explaining why the witness was
called. 9
On the other hand some authorities contend that the
purpose of admitting proof of prior inconsistent statements
is "merely for the purpose of neutralizing the unexpected
testimony of the treacherous witness."2
Let us consider a situation where the witness merely
claims to have forgotten or contends that he doesn't know.
If the first theory is correct then the party should be per-
mitted to prove the witness's prior affirmative statement to
explain why the witness was called, although there is not
so much need for this as if positive damaging testimony
were given. If the second theory is valid, however, such
proof would not be admissible, for in such a case there is
nothing to neutralize.
The accepted Maryland doctrine is that where the wit-
ness's testimony is such that it could not hurt the case of
the party calling him, but is merely not helpful, there is no
right of the party to introduce the prior statement.21 There-
fore the second theory must be the true one.
Impeachment of one's own witness by prior statements
is permissible in Maryland provided that two essential fac-
tors are present, namely surprise and damage.
Poe says of the first element:
"... where a party calls a witness in good faith,
relying upon his assurance of what his testimony will
be, and the witness, when on the stand, surprises and
deceives the party calling him by giving testimony at
variance with his former statements, it is competent to
discredit the testimony of such artful witness by proof
of his former contrary statements."22
The surprise must be bona fide. A party is not per-
mitted to call a witness whose testimony he knows will
1 Smith v. Briscoe, 65 Md. 561, 568, 5 A. 334 (1886), apparently sup-
ported by B. & 0. Ry. v. State, 107 Md. 642, 659, 69 A. 439 (1908).20 2 Por, loc. cit. supra n. 7.
21 Travelers Insurance Co. v. Herman, 154 Md. 171, 140 A. 64 (1928)
212 POE, Zo. cit. ,upra n. 7.
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be unfavorable to him, for the purpose of getting before
the jury favorable hearsay evidence by way of impeach-
ment of his own witness.2
3
Nor is a party permitted to impeach his own witness
through prior inconsistent statements which were not
made to him, to his attorney or, in a proper case, to some
one to be communicated to them.24  Thus in Murphy v.
State25 the Court properly refused, in a prosecution for as-
sault with intent to kill, to permit the introduction of evi-
dence of a prior inconsistent statement made, not to the
prosecuting attorney but to the prosecuting witness. "The
admission of such evidence should be strictly confined to
the only purpose for which it is at all admissible, namely,
to explain the surprise occasioned by contrary statements
made to the party calling the witness or his attorney in ref-
erence to the pending case."2"
In regard to this limitation, an interesting contention
was advanced by the appellants in the principal case. They
contended that since this action was brought under the
wrongful death statute, i. e., by the State for the use of the
plaintiff, the statements made by the witness before the
coroner were made to the appellants because the State
was a party to that proceeding as well as to this. The
Court held that such a theory "is too tenuous and fragile
for serious consideration. The coroner's inquest was an
inquisition, not a case. There were no parties to it. In
this case the State is a nominal statutory party, it has no
control of the case, is not liable for costs, has no voice in
the selection of counsel, receives no benefit if the equitable
plaintiff succeeds and suffers no loss if they fail. '27
Whether the party calling the witness has sustained sur-
prise or not is a question to be answered within the discre-
tion of the trial judge. As the Court has put it:
"... it is not every statement that may be made
even to the party litigant or his attorney, that should
be allowed to be contradicted by the party calling the
See Annotation to Young v. U. S., 97 Fed. (2d) 200, 117 A. L. R. 316,
329 (C. C. A. 5th 1938) ; 70 C. J. 1227.
' Smith v. Briscoe, 65 Md. 565, 568, 5 A. 334 (1886) ; 70 C. J. 1226.
5 Supra n. 5.
'
8 Murphy v. State, 120 Md. 229, 234, 87 A. 811, Ann. Cas. 1914 B. 1117
(1913). Compare Queen v. State, 5 H. & J. 232 (Md. 1821), where it ap-
pears that statements made to another were admitted by the trial court
and affirmed on appeal. However, the decision on appeal was due to a
procedural defect. The Court by way of dictum said that if this Issue
could have been properly prosecuted the decision of the lower court would
have been reversed.
S upra n. 1.
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witness. It should be left to the discretion of the judge
before whom the case is tried below to allow it to be
done. The court should be satisfied that the party has
been taken by surprise, and that the evidence is con-
trary to what he had just cause to expect from the wit-
ness based on his statements, and that such statements
were about material facts in the case. It is not every
light or trivial circumstance that would justify it. '28
The second essential factor necessary to be shown be-
fore the rule against impeaching one's own witness will
be relaxed is damage.
The statement in Court must be material 9 and it must
be injurious to the case of the party calling the witness. A
statement which is merely disappointing but which is not
detrimental to the party's case will not be sufficient basis to
relax the general rule.80
"The witness must give testimony prejudicial to the
party calling him and it is not enough that he disap-
points the expectations of such party by failing to give
beneficial testimony. So in order to bring himself
within the exception to the general rule against the
impeachment of one's own witness it must appear that
the party calling the witness was entrapped by his
previous statements into putting him on the stand and
was surprised by his testimony. '31
A further question of importance is the effect of the
prior statement, if it be permitted to be proved. It has
been held that the prior statement which is proved in this
manner must not be considered as evidence of the facts
stated. The result of such proof is merely to detract from
the weight to be given to the witness's testimony, and upon
motion the trial court should so instruct the jury. 2  "The
statement, however proved, has only an impeaching effect
and is not independent testimony."88
The principal case is in close accord with the law as set
out above. The opinion states, in clear language, the gen-
eral rule and its exceptions and seems to follow the antece-
dent cases.
11 Supra n. 24.
29 Ibid.
80 Supra n. 21.
8128 R. C. L. 228.
82 Mason v. Poulson, 43 Md. 161 (1875) ; WieMoRE, op. cit. supra n. 2, Sec.
906.
"8 PoE, loc. cit. supra n. 7.
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